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Do Biases in Probability Judgment Matter in Markets? 
Experimental Evidence 
By COLIN F. CAMERER* 
Microeconomic theory typically concerns 
exchange between individuals or firms in a 
market setting. To make predictions precise, 
individuals are usually assumed to use the 
laws of probability in structuring and revis- 
ing beliefs about uncertainties. Recent evi- 
dence, mostly gathered by psychologists, 
suggests probability theories might be inade- 
quate descriptive models of individual choice. 
(See the books edited by Daniel Kahneman 
et al., 1982a, and by Hal Arkes and Kenneth 
Hammond, 1986.) 
Of course, individual violations of norma- 
tive theories of judgment or choice may be 
corrected by experience and incentives in 
markets, thus producing market outcomes 
which are consistent with the individual- 
rationality assumption even if that assump- 
tion is wrong for most agents. Whether judg- 
ment and choice violations matter in markets 
is a question that begs for empirical analysis. 
In this paper I use experimental markets 
to address this issue (see also Rong Duh and 
Shyam Sunder, 1986; and Vernon Smith, 
1982, for an overview). In these markets, 
traders are paid dividends for holding a 
one-period asset. The amount of the divi- 
dend depends upon which of two states oc- 
curred. Traders know the prior probabilities 
of the states, and a sample of likelihood 
information about which state occurred. The 
setting is designed so that prices and alloca- 
tions will reveal whether traders use Bayes' 
rule to integrate the prior and the sample 
information, or whether they judge the likeli- 
hood of each state by the "representative- 
ness" of the sample to the state (Amos 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1982b). (Several 
other non-Bayesian psychological theories 
can be tested, too.) 
Evidence of judgment bias reported by 
psychologists poses an implicit challenge to 
economic theory based on rationality. Some- 
times that challenge is made explicit, as when 
Kenneth Arrow suggested that use of the 
representativeness heuristic " typifies very 
precisely the excessive reaction to current 
information which seems to characterize all 
the securities and futures markets" (1982, p. 
5). Others have warned that judgment biases 
will affect the judgments of well-trained ex- 
perts who make societal decisions (about the 
risk of low-probability hazards, for instance, 
see Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff, and Sarah 
Lichtenstein, 1976). 
Assertions as bold as Arrow's are ex- 
tremely rare, because the faith that individ- 
ual irrationality will not affect markets is a 
strong part of the "oral tradition" in eco- 
nomics. This faith is often defended with 
Milton Friedman's (1953) famous claim that 
theories with false assumptions (such as 
strong assumptions of individual rationality) 
might still predict market behavior well (see 
Mark Blaug, 1980, pp. 104-14, for a cogent 
discussion). Besides that "F-twist," there is a 
standard list of arguments used to defend 
economic theories from the criticism that 
people are not rational. (Counterarguments 
are given in parentheses.) 
1) In markets, agents have enough 
financial incentive, and experience, to avoid 
mistakes. (Incentives and experience were 
provided in David Grether's 1980 experi- 
ments on the representativeness heuristic. See 
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also Charles Plott and Louis Wilde, 1982, p. 
97.) 
2) Random mistakes of individuals will 
cancel out. (The biases found by psycholo- 
gists are generally systematic -most people 
err in the same direction.) 
3) Only a small number of rational 
agents are needed to make market outcomes 
rational, if those agents have access to 
enough capital or factors of production. (In- 
stitutional constraints may prevent those 
agents from making markets rational; see 
Thomas Russell and Richard Thaler, 1985.) 
4) Agents who are less rational may 
learn implicitly from the actions of more 
rational agents. (This argument requires that 
"more rational" agents are identifiable, per- 
haps by their more vigorous trading.) 
5) Agents who are less rational may 
learn explicitly from more rational agents by 
buying advice or information. (Institutional 
constraints, and the well-known problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard, may 
limit the extent of information markets.) 
6) Agents who are less rational may be 
driven from the market by bankruptcy, either 
by natural forces or at the hands of more 
rational competitors. (A new supply of agents 
who are less rational, or inexperienced, may 
be constantly entering the market.) 
Most of these arguments, though not all of 
them, are put to the test in the market 
experiments described below. Subjects trade 
for up to 7 hours, observing nearly 100 reali- 
zations of the state variable, and every trade 
earns them a (small) dollar profit or loss 
(argument 1). The representativeness heuris- 
tic is systematic in direction (argument 2). 
Subjects trade with one another in a "dou- 
ble-oral" auction with no constraints on bid- 
ding or offering activity (argument 3), so 
they can learn implicitly from others' trading 
behavior (argument 4). 
Many of the standard arguments are not 
tested in the experiments: There is no ex- 
plicit market for advice (argument 5); sub- 
jects cannot sell short (argument 3); and 
bankruptcy is unlikely, though conceivable 
(argument 6). The first two arguments are 
being tested in further work. Even with these 
limits, the market experiments provide a 
greater combination of incentives, experi- 
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ence, and learning opportunity than in previ- 
ous judgment experiments. 
I. Experimental Design 
In the experiments, each of 8 or 10 traders 
is endowed with two assets that live one 
period and pay a liquidating state-dependent 
dividend. 
A. State Probabilities 
The state is represented by which one of 
two bingo cages (X or Y) is chosen (Figure 
1). A third bingo cage containing 10 balls is 
used to determine whether cage X or cage Y 
has been chosen. The X cage contains 1 red 
and 2 black balls. The Y cage contains 2 red 
balls and 1 black one. The prior probabilities 
of X and Y are .6 and .4.1 Figure 1 is shown 
on a blackboard for all subjects to see, 
throughout the experiment. 
After either X or Y is chosen (but not 
announced), a sample of three balls is drawn 
from the chosen cage, with replacement, and 
the sample is announced before trading be- 
gins. Since the cages X and Y contain differ- 
ent populations of balls, which are known 
to traders, they can use Bayes' rule to calcu- 
late P(X/sample) from the prior P(X) and 
1Unequal priors were chosen because priors of .5 and 
.5 might have made it too easy for subjects to intuit the 
Bayesian posteriors. Experiments with equal priors are a 
natural direction for future work. 
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TABLE 1-BAYESIAN EXPECTED DIVIDEND VALUES 
Bayesian Posterior P( X/sample) 
.923 .750 .429 .158 
Bayesian Expected Valuesa 
No. of Traders Dividend No. of Reds 
Type (Experiment No.) X Y 0 1 2 3 
I 5 (1,3-5,11x-15xh) 4 (2,9r,10h) 500 200 477 425 329 247 
II 5 (1,3-5,llx-15xh) 4 (2,9r,10h) 350 650 373 425 521 603 
I 5 (6-7) 4 (8,12x) 525 225 502 450 354 272 
II 5 (6-7) 4 (8,12x) 180 480 203 255 351 433 
Note: All dividends were actually 80 francs higher, for both types of traders and in both 
states, in experienced subjects experiments llx, 13x-15xh. (Therefore, all Bayesian 
expected values are 80 francs higher, too.) In all analyses prices are adjusted for this 
80-franc difference. 
aIn francs. 
the likelihood functions P(sample/X) and 
P(sample/Y) (which are determined by the 
cage contents). The top line of Table 1 gives 
the Bayesian posteriors for all three-ball 
samples. The possible samples are char- 
acterized by the number of reds only, since 
the order of draws should not matter and the 
data suggest the order did not matter to 
subjects. (In some experiments, like John 
Hey's 1982 experiments on price search, 
order does seem to matter. Subjects were 
paid in his 1987 experiments and order still 
mattered.) 
B. Market Procedure 
Subjects were undergraduate men, and 
some women, recruited from quantitative 
methods and economics classes at the Whar- 
ton School. These students have all taken 
statistics and economics courses. Experi- 
ments 1 to 10 used subjects who had not 
been in any previous market experiments. 
Five experiments used "experienced" sub- 
jects who had been in experiments 1 to 10; 
these experiments are numbered llx to 15xh 
(the "x" reminds the reader that subjects 
were experienced). Experiments were con- 
ducted in one 3-hour session (experiments 1 
and 2, 6, 9 and 10, llx to 15xh) or two 
2-hour sessions held on consecutive evenings 
(experiments 3 to 5, 7 and 8). 
All trading and earnings are in terms of 
francs, which are converted to dollars at the 
end of the experiment at a rate of $.001 
dollars per franc ($.0015 in experiment 1).2 
Traders are endowed with 10,000 francs and 
two certificates in each trading period, and 
10,000 francs is subtracted from their total 
francs at the end of each period. In some 
experiments a known fixed cost (around 
5,000 francs) was subtracted from their total 
earnings at the end of the experiment. 
Traders voluntarily exchange assets in a 
"double-oral auction": Buyers shout out bids 
at which they will buy, sellers shout out 
offers at which they will sell. Bids must top 
outstanding bids and offers must undercut 
outstanding offers. A matching bid and offer 
is a trade, which erases all previous bids and 
offers. All bids, offers, and trades in a period 
are recorded by the experimenter on a trans- 
parency visible to subjects. (No history of 
previous periods of trading is posted.) Trad- 
ing periods last 4 minutes in 10-subject ex- 
periments, 3 minutes in 8-subject experi- 
ments. 
At the end of each trading period the state 
(X or Y) is announced and traders calculate 
2In practice, using francs makes traders more precise 
in their trading than they would be with dollars, for 
example, traders routinely haggle over 5-franc dif- 
ferences between bids and offers, which represent half a 
penny. Francs may also alleviate competition among 
traders for relative status in dollar earnings, because 
traders' dollar conversion rates (while identical) are 
privately known. 
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their profits. Dollar profits are given by 
(1) PROFITS 
Xs Xb 
=X Ef-R + , 0i- L Bj +D(S) 
L ~ 
=lI j=l 
x (EC-xS+ Xb)-F 
where X= dollar-per-franc conversion rate, 
Ef= initial endowment in francs, 
Rf= amount of francs repaid at per- 
iod-end, 
E= initial endowment in certificates, 
x= number of certificates sold, 
0i= selling price of ith certificate sold, 
Xb= number of certificates bought, 
Bj= purchase price of jth certificate 
bought, 
D(S) = dividends per certificate in state 
S, 
F = fixed cost per experiment in 
francs. 
Traders may not sell short (that is, EC -X 
+ xb cannot be negative), and net francs on 
hand (Ef + Yi - -B1) cannot be negative. 
C. Market Equilibrium 
Assuming risk neutrality, traders' reserva- 
tion prices for assets are expected values. (If 
they are not risk neutral, their reservation 
prices are certainty equivalents.) Since each 
trader's endowment of francs is large enough 
to buy virtually the entire market supply of 
assets, and the supply is fixed (by the initial 
endowment, and the short-selling restriction), 
there is excess demand at any price less than 
the highest expected value. Thus, in competi- 
tive equilibrium, prices should be bid up to 
the largest expected value of any trader. One 
irrational trader who pays too much can 
therefore create a market price that is too 
high. The empirical question is whether such 
traders exist, and whether the experience 
and financial discipline of a market makes 
them more rational over the course of an 
experiment. 
Of course, the double-oral auction is not 
Walrasian, so there is no theoretical as- 
surance that competitive equilibrium will 
result. However, simple models of the dou- 
ble-oral auction as a dynamic game with 
incomplete information are beginning to 
establish the theoretical tendency of double- 
oral auctions to converge to competitive 
equilibrium (Daniel Friedman, 1984; Robert 
Wilson, 1985; see David Easley and John 
Ledyard, 1986). The empirical tendency to 
converge is well-established (for example, 
Smith, 1982), even in designs meant to in- 
hibit convergence (Smith and Arlington 
Williams, in press). 
D. Competing Theories 
In each experiment, traders are randomly 
assigned to either of two "types," which 
differ in the dividends they receive in the two 
states X and Y (see Table 1). The dividends 
are chosen so that competing theories pre- 
dict different patterns of prices and alloca- 
tions (see Table 2). Each theory will now be 
described briefly. 
Bayesian. If traders use Bayes' rule to 
calculate posterior probabilities given the 
sample data, prices should converge to the 
Bayesian expected values given in Table 2, 
assuming risk neutrality. (Tests and controls 
for risk neutrality are described below.) In 
the experiments described by the top panel 
of Table 2, for instance, type I traders should 
pay up to 477 if the sample is 0 reds, 425 if 1 
red, 329 if 2 reds, and 247 if 3 reds. Type II 
traders should pay up to 373, 425, 521, and 
603, respectively. Therefore, if the sample is 
0 reds, then type I traders should buy from 
type II traders at a price of 477. If the 
sample is 2 or 3 reds, the type II traders 
should buy all the units, at prices of 521 or 
603, respectively. If the sample is 1 red, then 
type I and type II traders both have a Bayes- 
ian expected value of 425 francs, so we ex- 
pect half the units will be held by each of the 
two types of traders. (Trades might take 
place because of uncontrolled differences in 
risk tastes, but units are still equally as likely 
to end up in the hands of type I and type II 
traders.) In experiments 6 to 8 and 12x, 
dividends were chosen so that the Bayesian 
expected values of the type I and type II 
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TABLE 2-PRICE AND ALLOCATION PREDICTIONS OF COMPETING THEORIES 
Predictions Expressed as: Price P (Type Holding Assets) 
Number of Reds in Sample 
Theory 0 Reds 1 Red 2 Reds 3 Reds 
Experiments 1-5, 9r-11x, 13x-15xh 
Bayesian 477 (I) 425 (1,II) 521 (II) 603 (II) 
Exact Representativeness 477 (I) P > 425 (I) P > 521 (II) 603 (II) 
Conservatism P < 477 (I) P > 425 (II) P < 521 (II) P < 603 (II) 
Overreaction P > 477 (I) P > 425 (I) P > 521 (II) P > 603 (II) 
Base-Rate Ignorance 467 (I) 450 (II) 550 (II) 617 (II) 
Experiments 6-8, 12x 
Bayesian 502 (I) 450 (I) 354 (I) 433 (II) 
Exact Representativeness 502 (I) P > 450 (I) P > 354 (II) 433 (II) 
Conservatism P < 502 (I) P < 450 (I) P > 354 (I) P < 433 (II) 
Overreaction P > 502 (I) P > 450 (I) P > 354 (II) P > 433 (II) 
Base-Rate Ignorance 492 (I) 425 (II) 380 (II) 447 (II) 
traders were (nearly) equal when a 2-red 
sample was drawn. 
Exact Representativeness. If subjects 
take the representativeness of the sample to 
the cage contents as a psychological index of 
the cage's likelihood, non-Bayesian expected 
values might result. Representativeness is a 
vague notion, but we can distinguish some 
precise variants of it. For instance, subjects 
might think P(X/sample) =1, if the sample 
resembles the X-cage contents more closely 
than the Y-cage contents. Or they might 
think P( X/sample) = 1, if the sample ex- 
actly matches the X-cage contents. These 
extreme hypotheses are clearly ruled out by 
the data presented below. 
More reasonably, subjects may be intui- 
tively Bayesian for most samples, but over- 
estimate a cage's likelihood when a sample 
resembles the cage exactly. This "exact rep- 
resentativeness" theory predicts that subjects 
will judge P( X/1 red) to be greater than the 
Bayesian posterior .75 because a 1-red sam- 
ple exactly matches the X-cage's contents. 
Similarly, P(Y/2 red) will be judged to be 
greater than .57; other probabilities will be 
Bayesian. Of course, there are other possible 
interpretations but since they are either im- 
precise or clearly incorrect, only exact repre- 
sentativeness will be considered carefully. 
Under exact representativeness, prices will 
be higher than Bayesian in 1- and 2-red 
periods (as shown in Table 2) and type I 
traders will hold units in 1-red periods. (Re- 
call that the Bayesian theory predicts types I 
and II are equally likely to hold units in 
1-red periods.) 
Base-Rate Ignorance. If subjects judge 
P(state/sample) by the representativeness of 
samples to states, their judgments may ignore 
differences in the prior probabilities (or 
"base rates") of states (Tversky and Kahne- 
man, 1982b). In our setting it is difficult to 
integrate this aspect of representativeness 
with other aspects, like the psychological 
power of exact representativeness, because 
the two aspects often work in opposite direc- 
tions. In 1-red samples, for instance, exact 
representativeness predicts P( X/1 red) will 
be overestimated, while ignorance of the 
higher base rate of X implies P(X/1 red) 
will be underestimated. Since predictions of 
a theory that integrates representativeness 
with base-rate ignorance are ambiguous, I 
define base-rate ignorance as using Bayes' 
rule with erroneous priors P(X) = P(Y) = 
.5. Predictions of this theory are shown in 
Table 2. 
Of course, ignoring base rates completely 
is rather implausible. For example, in an 
experiment with a prior probability of .001, 
it seems unlikely that subjects will act as if 
the prior is .5. If priors are simply un- 
derweighted, but not ignored, the data will 
show some statistical support for the com- 
plete base-rate ignorance theory. The theory 
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should be considered an extreme benchmark 
that helps us judge whether priors are under- 
weighted at all. 
Conservatism. Subjects may be "con- 
servative" in adjusting prior probabilities 
for sample evidence (for example, Ward 
Edwards, 1968). 
Overreaction. Subjects may adjust prior 
probabilities too much, as if overreacting to 
sample evidence. The overreaction theory 
makes the same prediction as representative- 
ness in 1- and 2-red periods, but it predicts 
bias in 0- and 3-red periods where repre- 
sentativeness does not. Note that the con- 
servatism and overreaction theories make ex- 
actly opposite predictions. This implies quite 
a challenge for the Bayesian theory: Prices 
must be exactly at the Bayesian prediction, 
or insignificantly different from it, for both 
theories to be falsified. 
II. Results 
Fifteen experiments have been conducted 
ten with inexperienced subjects, five with 
experienced subjects- excluding two incon- 
clusive pilot experiments. For the sake of 
brevity, many details of the analyses are 
omitted and can be found in working papers 
available from the author. 
There are two kinds of data which dis- 
tinguish between theories: prices at which 
trades occurred, and the number of units of 
the asset that traders held at the end of 
trading periods. 
A. Trade Prices 
The mean prices across experiments 1 to 8 
are summarized by a time-series of 90 per- 
cent confidence intervals, shown in Figure 
2.3 The upper (lower) solid line is the upper 
(francs) e p t e a 
k 0 red I red 2 reds 3 reds 
6 1 1 12 5 
number Of periods 
FIGURE 2 
(lower) end of the confidence interval. Bayes- 
ian expected values are shown by dashed 
lines, and the direction of the exact repre- 
sentativeness prediction is shown by an arrow 
marked "R." Each of the four panels repre- 
sents a different sample. From left to right, 
observations within a panel represent data 
from the first time that sample was drawn, 
the second time the same sample was drawn, 
and so forth. 
Prices converge, from below, toward the 
Bayesian levels. These data clearly rule out 
many non-Bayesian theories of probability 
judgment (like the two extreme brands of 
representativeness mentioned above). How- 
ever, prices do not converge exactly to the 
Bayesian expected values. There is some evi- 
dence of exact representativeness, because 
prices drift above the Bayesian expected val- 
ues in 1- and 2-red periods. However, the 
confidence intervals are wide, and the degree 
of bias is rather small. Indeed, since prices 
should only converge to Bayesian predict- 
ions if the hypotheses of risk neutrality, 
3 Confidence intervals were constructed by first 
calculating mean prices in each period of each experi- 
ment, then separating the time-series of mean prices for 
each different sample. Data from experiments 6 to 8 
were normalized so that the Bayesian predictions in 
those experiments were the same as in experiments 1 to 
5. This yields groups of data such as 8 mean prices from 
the first 0-red period in each of the 8 experiments 
numbered 1 to 8. The mean of those means, and its 
standard error (the standard deviation divided by 81/2) 
are used to calculate the 90 percent confidence interval. 
A second confidence interval was calculated using mean 
prices from the second 0-red period in each of the 8 
experiments, and so on. Not all experiments have the 
same number of 0-red periods, so the number of ob- 
servations in each confidence interval gradually de- 
creases. The procedure was stopped just before there 
was only one experiment left with an Nth observation 
of a particular sample. 
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competitive equilibrium, and Bayesian up- 
dating are all true simultaneously, it is rather 
remarkable that prices converge as closely to 
the Bayesian predictions as they do. 
Figure 3 shows confidence intervals from 
experiments with experienced subjects. Prices 
begin closer to the Bayesian expected value, 
and have less tendency to drift above it in l- 
and 2-red periods. The confidence intervals 
are also wide, because they summarize a 
small number of experiments.4 
We can define bias in prices as a deviation 
from the Bayesian prediction. If the Bayes- 
ian theory is true, biases will be around zero. 
To conduct statistical tests on price biases, 
the time-series of prices in each experiment 
must be independent. Since prices are typi- 
cally autocorrelated, the equilibrium degree 
of bias is estimated from a simple partial 
adaptation model (a first-order autoregres- 
sion), 
(2) Pt PBayes a + b(Pt-l PBayes) + e, 
where P1 is the t th observation of price and 
PBayes is the Bayesian prediction. This 
specification implies that the deviation from 
equilibrium is reduced by a fraction 1 - b 
each trade. If b is close to 1, convergence is 
very slow; if b is close to 0, convergence is 
fast. While there is no theoretical rationale 
for (2), it works well empirically and there is 
no well-established theory of price conver- 
gence which suggests it is wrong. 
Call the bias for the t th price B,; it equals 
Pt- PBayes. If we define equilibrium as a bias 
that does not change each period, we impose 
Bt =Bt_1 = B on (2) and get 
(3) B=a+bB+e,. 
Since E(e,) = 0, a little algebra shows that 
we can estimate the degree of equilibrium 
bias B consistently by the estimator B'= 
a'/(l- b'), where a' and b' denote ordinary 
least squares estimators of a and b in (2). 
The standard error of B' can be calculated 
from a Taylor series approximation involv- 
ing the variances of a' and b' and their 
covariance. 
Regressions were first run separately for 
each period, effectively allowing a and b to 
vary each period. The simple specification 
(2) fit fairly well: The convergence rate b 
was typically estimated precisely, and residu- 
als were uncorrelated and roughly homo- 
skedastic. An F-test (Jan Kmenta, 1971, p. 
373) was used to test whether adjacent peri- 
ods could be pooled at the 10 percent level. 
Periods were pooled, starting with the last 
period, until the F-test was violated. 
The estimate B' resulting from the last 
group of poolable periods in each experi- 
ment are shown in Table 3. Also reported is 
the t-statistic testing the hypothesis that B = 
0, which is simply B' divided by its (ap- 
proximated) standard error. Sample sizes 
are shown in parentheses next to each ex- 
periment number. T-statistics marked with 
asterisks are unreliable because the assump- 
tion of normality of residuals was violated at 
the 1 percent level, by the studentized range 
4Intervals flare out in Figure 3 when the number of 
different experiments used to construct them drops 
steeply and standard errors increase dramatically. 
5I thank Dave Grether for correcting a mistake in 
earlier estimates of V(B'). The Taylor series approxi- 
mation of a'/(l - b') around its true value a/(I - b) is 
a/(1- b)+(a'- a)/(1- b)+ a(b'- b)/(l- b)2, plus 
some higher-order terms. Using this expression to 
calculate (approximately) V(a/(I - b)), or E[(a'/(1 - 
b') - a/(I - b))21 yields V(a')/(l - b)2 + a2V(b')/(l 
- b)4 + 2aCOV(a', b')/(l - b)3. Evaluating this ex- 
pression at a' and b' gives approximations of V( B'). 
988 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW DECEMBER 1987 
TABLE 3-ESTIMATES OF BIAS IN EQUILIBRIUM PRICES, AND TESTS OF 
THE BAYESIAN HYPOTHESIS AGAINST COMPETING HYPOTHESES 
0-Red Periods 
Bias Significance Levels, Bayesian vs. Base-Rate 
Experiment (n) B t-Statistic Conservatism Overreaction Ignorance 
Inexperienced subjects 
1 (24) -28.31 2.31 .01 .99 .06 
2 (46) 19.28 10.95 .999 .000 .000 
3 (54) -11.09 - 3.67* .000 .999 .999 
4 (57) 4.97 4.56* .999 .000 .000 
5 (10) - 22.35 - 6.57 .000 .000 .999 
6 (29) 15.36 5.67* .999 .000 .999 
7 (70) 32.44 .65* .76 .24 .57 
8 (7) - 37.90 - 2.20 .99 .01 .12 
9r (9) 10.01 8.70 .000 .999 .999 
lOh (10) -2.54 -1.16* .12 .88 .999 
mean - 2.95 .49 .51 .57 
Experienced subjects 
llx (53) -44.12 12.15 .000 .999 .999 
12x (34) 15.17 1.78 .96 .04 .01 
13x (8) 76.50 .49 .69 .31 .51 
14x (18) 11.61 3.64 .999 .000 .999 
15xh (16) 4.92 1.41 .92 .08 .35 
mean 2.14 .71 .29.57 
1-Red Periods 
Exact Representativeness, Base-Rate 
Bayesian vs. Overreaction Conservatism Ignorance 
1 (13) 5.00 2.63* .005 .005 .999 
2 (40) 56.34 7.94* .000 .000 .000 
3 (40) 1.18 .29* .46 .46 .999 
4 (25) 49.81 18.94 .000 .000 .000 
5 (37) 31.19 10.23 .000 .000 .000 
6 (28) 51.80 9.10 .000 .999 .999 
7 (16) 23.12 4.65 .001 .999 .985 
8 (57) 93.83 .18 .43 .57 .51 
9r (8) 51.15 6.21 .000 .000 .000 
lOh (50) 54.63 14.12* .000 .000 .000 
mean 39.92 .09 .30 .45 
llx (44) - 2.76 - 2.08 .98 .98 .999 
12x (7) 32.18 3.82 .001 .999 .999 
13x (24) .96 .49 .31 .31 .999 
14x (33) 27.88 1.89* .03 .03 .21 
15xh (8) 29.77 3.49 .005 .005 .001 
mean 17.61 .27 .47 .64 
(continued) 
test. Other diagnostic tests and estimates of 
b are reported in working papers. 
Roughly speaking, biases are distributed 
around zero in 0-, 2-, and 3-red periods. 
Biases are positive in 1-red periods of every 
experiment except llx, generally with large 
t-statistics. Biases are also positive in 2-red 
periods with experienced subjects, but not 
with inexperienced subjects. 
The right-hand columns of Table 3 test 
the hypothesis that prices are Bayesian 
against each of the competing theories. The 
tests of the Bayesian theory against exact 
representativeness, conservatism, and overre- 
action are one-tailed t-tests of the null hy- 
pothesis B = 0 against one-sided alternative 
hypotheses (which vary depending upon the 
theory and the sample). Since the base-rate 
ignorance theory predicts a point estimate of 
the bias rather than a direction, the signifi- 
cance level of the Bayesian hypothesis against 
the base-rate ignorance alternative was esti- 
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TABLE 3 -(CONTINUED) 
2-Red Periods 
Exact Representativeness, Base-Rate 
Bayesian vs. Overreaction Conservatism Ignorance 
1 (61) - 27.00 -4.84 .999 .000 .999 
2 (24) 60.25 .11 .46 .54 .50 
3 (22) 99.00 6.27 .000 .999 .000 
4 (83) 77.39 7.74 .000 .999 .000 
5 (52) - 53.31 6.55 .76 .24 .64 
6 (77) -1.74 -.02* .51 .51 .52 
7 (16) 98.24 18.16 .000 .000 .000 
8 (16) 45.45 3.35 .001 .001 .000 
9r (24) -17.23 -4.55 .999 .000 .999 
10h (27) -7.57 -.95 .67 .33 .999 
mean 27.35 .44 .36 .44 
llx (18) 49.28 7.55 .000 .999 .000 
12x (8) 20.80 12.16* .000 .000 .000 
13x (15) 17.22 14.35 .000 .999 .000 
14x (11) 22.62 18.26 .000 .999 .000 
15xh (17) 12.47 .80 .21 .79 .62 
mean 24.48 .04 .78 .12 
3-Red Periods 
Base-Rate 
Bayesian vs. Conservatism Overreaction Ignorance 
1 (40) 2.47 .40 .65 .35 .04 
2 (17) - 209.34 - 3.51 .000 .999 .85 
3 (41) 41.88 4.12* .999 .000 .000 
4 (48) 11.26 .64* .74 .26 .41 
5 (26) - 10.57 .70 .24 .76 .90 
6 (32) 31.55 1.29* .90 .10 .24 
7 (22) 20.04 3.24* .999 .001 .000 
8 (28) - 26.46 -.79 .29 .71 .70 
9r (29) 14.01 .29 .61 .39 .48 
10h (7) 2.61 .02 .51 .49 .50 
mean - 12.23 .59 .41 .41 
(2 deleted) 9.64 
llx (37) - 22.51 - 6.52 .000 .999 .999 
12 x (9) 24.98 .49 .69 .31 .39 
13x (35) 11.65 .65 .74 .26 .40 
14x (28) 114.21 .13 .55 .45 .50 
15xh (9) - 38.00 - 3.74 .000 .999 .999 
mean 4.70 .40 .60 .66 
Notes: * denotes studentized range of residuals greater than the 1 percent level for normality, so standard errors are 
unreliable. Biases are truncated in calculating means when the equilibrium price implied by the bias estimate is 
greater than the maximum dividend for the type of trader holding a majority of units (for example, 0-red period, 
experiment 7). 
mated from likelihood ratios.6 Significance 
levels were estimated by assuming the t-sta- 
tistics were normally distributed (a reason- 
able approximation for most of the sample 
sizes in Table 3). Levels less than .001 or 
above .999 are reported as .000 or .999. 
The significance levels of tests against most 
of the alternative theories are roughly 50 
percent, suggesting departures from the 
Bayesian predictions are not systematic. 
However, the Bayesian theory can be strongly 
rejected against the alternative of exact rep- 
resentativeness in most 1-red periods and 
6P(data/Bayesian) and P(data/Base-rate Ignorance) 
were calculated assuming the estimate B' was normally 
distributed with standard deviation s( B'). Assuming 
one of the two theories is true, and they are equally 
likely; Bayes' rule can then be used to calculate 
P(Bayesian/data). 
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many 2-red periods. Of course, the statistical 
significance of a bias is simply a measure of 
whether it could be due to chance. Whether 
the biases are economically significant is dis- 
cussed in the conclusion. 
Note that the graphs and the statistical 
tests seem to tell different stories because the 
confidence intervals are wide while the t-sta- 
tistics are large. This simply means that bi- 
ases are not random in each experiment 
(hence, the extreme significance levels in Ta- 
ble 3), but the degree of bias varies a lot 
across experiments (hence, the wide con- 
fidence intervals). 
In most experiments subjects did not make 
probability calculations during the experi- 
ment (though they were given calculators to 
record profits). However, in experiment 1 
two traders did write the correct likelihood 
ratios P( X/sample)/P( Y/sample) on their 
profit sheets during the experiment; prices 
were quite close to Bayesian (for example, 
1-red prices were only 5 francs too high). A 
small number of aggressive Bayesians ap- 
parently can make the market price Bayes- 
ian, but did not do so very often. 
B. Allocations of Assets 
For most samples, competing theories all 
predict the same type of trader will hold 
units. When the theories make the same pre- 
diction, they are extremely accurate. In 0-red 
and 3-red periods, for instance, virtually all 
of the units are held by the traders with the 
highest expected dividend type in every ex- 
periment. 
The theories disagree about allocations in 
1-red periods of some experiments and 2-red 
periods of other experiments. In these ex- 
periments, the average fraction of traders 
holding any units at the end of the period 
and the average fraction of units held were 
calculated for dividend types I and II. These 
data are shown in Table 4. 
In the 1-red periods, the Bayesian theory 
predicts type I and type II traders are equally 
likely to hold units (since their expected 
values are equal, at 425). Exact repre- 
sentativeness predicts units will be held by 
type I's. 
Across all experiments with inexperienced 
subjects, type I's hold 78 percent of the 
units. This fraction is quite stable across 
experiments, and is about the same in early 
periods (the first half of the periods) and late 
periods. With experienced subjects, about 90 
percent of the units are held by type I's. 
Prices biases were apparently not due to 
simple one or two type I's buying units, 
because about 80 percent of the type I sub- 
jects held any units, compared to roughly 30 
percent of the type II subjects. Significance 
tests using mean data from each experiment 
strongly reject the Bayesian theory against 
the alternative of exact representativeness.7 
Such cross-experiment ests are especially re- 
liable because we can be confident that dif- 
ferent experiments are genuinely indepen- 
dent because they contain different subjects. 
The smaller amount of data from 2-red 
periods (the bottom panel of Table 4) are 
not very conclusive. The Bayesian theory 
predicts type I's will hold, exact repre- 
sentativeness predicts type II's, and holdings 
are about equal. This corroborates the find- 
ing from price data that exact representative- 
ness has little effect in 2-red periods. 
The results of Duh and Sunder (1986) are 
worth summarizing at this point. In their 
experiments, the two states (called R and 
W) are two bingo cages containing 16 red 
and 4 black balls (R) and 4 red and 16 black 
balls (W). The prior P(R) varied from .65 
to .85 across experiments, since their main 
concern was whether subjects ignored prior 
probabilities. One ball is drawn from which- 
ever cage (state) is chosen (so there is no 
possibility of exact representativeness). They 
find that when an R is drawn, prices are 
close to Bayesian. When a W was drawn, the 
Bayesian theory predicted about as well as a 
base-rate ignorance theory (denoted NBR2) 
in which P(R) and P(W) are judged to be 
equal, and an extreme version of repre- 
sentativeness in which P(W) is judged to be 
7We can test the hypothesis that the average per- 
centage holding of type I's was 50 percent by assuming 
the fractions across experiments 1 to 5, 9r and lOh are 
normally distributed (the t-statistic is 9.28). The more 
conservative binomial test of successes yields a signifi- 
cance level less than 1 percent. For experienced subjects 
these statistics are 10.33 and 6 percent. 
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TABLE 4-HOLDINGS OF UNITS AT PERIOD END, BY TRADER TYPE 
Experiment 
(n = no. of periods) Type I Type II 
1-Red Periods 
Bayesian, Exact 
Theories predicting Representativeness, Bayesian, Conservatism, 
Each Type to Hold: Overreaction Base-Rate Ignorance 
Inexperienced Fraction Fraction Fraction Fraction 
Subjects Holding Any Held Holding Any Held 
1 (n = 5) .76 .85 .24 .15 
2 (n = 7) .76 .82 .50 .18 
3 (n = 9) .94 .75 .42 .25 
4 (n = 12) .67 .73 .38 .27 
5 (n =10) .76 .64 .56 .36 
9r (n = 8) .91 .85 .30 .15 
10h (n = 7) .69 .85 .37 .15 
Means All Periods: .787 .784 .396 .216 
Early Periods: .82 .73 .53 .27 
Late Periods: .76 .82 .31 .18 
Experienced Subjects 
llx .91 .93 .25 .07 
13x .95 .78 .56 .22 
14x .50 .95 .10 .05 
1Sxh .91 .97 .09 .03 
Means All Periods: .818 .908 .250 .092 
Early Periods: .88 .87 .29 .13 
Late Periods: .76 .94 .21 .06 
2-Red Periods 
Exact Representativeness, 
Theories Predicting Bayesian Overreaction, Base-Rate 
Each Type to Hold Conservatism Ignorance 
6 (n =11) .53 .36 .75 .64 
7 (n =11) .57 .60 .45 .40 
8 (n = 8) .71 .49 .83 .51 
12x (n =13) .76 .40 .88 .60 
Means All Periods: .643 .463 .728 .538 
Early Periods: .64 .42 .77 .58 
Late Periods: .66 .52 .67 .48 
one (denoted NBR1). They do not estimate 
the degree of price bias parametrically, but it 
seems to be smaller in magnitude than the 
biases observed here. They conclude, "Al- 
though the Bayesian model performs best 
among the four models in its ability to pre- 
dict transaction prices, the observed market 
behavior still deviates from the Bayesian 
prescription." I suspect the Bayesian model 
predicts better in their experiments than in 
mine because the exact representativeness in 
my experiments is a stronger psychological 
force than the base-rate ignorance in theirs. 
C. Further Controls for Risk 
and Incentives 
The analyses of prices and allocations lean 
heavily on the assumption that traders are 
risk neutral, so that they trade at expected 
values. If traders are risk seeking, prices will 
be above expected values. The higher prices 
observed in 1-red periods could therefore 
reflect risk seeking by Bayesian traders rather 
than judgment bias by risk-neutral traders. 
This explanation is unlikely for several 
reasons. First, the Arrow-Pratt risk pre- 
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mium, which measures the approximate de- 
gree to which prices depart from expected 
values because of risk seeking, depends only 
on the variance of an asset's value (and 
possibly its mean) and the shape of traders' 
utility functions. The mean and variance of 
the value of units are identical for type I and 
type II traders in 1-red periods, so their risk 
premia should be equal (assuming no sys- 
tematic differences in utility functions). 
Therefore, the Bayesian prediction that type 
I and type II traders hold equal amounts of 
units should be true even if traders are not 
risk neutral; but the equal holdings predict- 
ion is strongly rejected. 
Second, most attempts at measuring risk 
tastes in experimental settings find evidence 
of risk aversion rather than risk seeking (for 
example, James Cox, Smith, and James 
Walker, 1985; Smith, Gerry Suchanek, and 
Williams, 1987). Third, the allocation data 
show that about 80 percent of the type I 
traders are holding units at the high prices in 
1-red periods. It seems unlikely that almost 
every type I trader in every experiment would 
be risk seeking. Fourth, the data from all 
four samples can be used to estimate the 
degree of risk seeking implicit in prices, as- 
suming a specific utility function. Adjusting 
the apparent price biases in 1-red periods for 
risk does reduce them by about two-thirds, 
but not quite to zero.8 
More direct evidence of whether risk seek- 
ing can explain the biases comes from a 
control experiment (denoted 9r) in which 
risk neutrality was induced by design (see 
Alvin Roth, 1983; Joyce Berg et al., 1986; 
though, see Cox et al., 1985). Traders accu- 
mulated earnings in francs but the francs 
were not converted into dollars at the end of 
the experiment. Instead, traders were paid 
$15 plus a $50 bonus if a uniformly distrib- 
uted five-digit number between 0 and 50,000 
was below their amount of earnings. Each 
franc they earned then raised their probabil- 
ity of winning the $50 prize by 1/50,000; so 
francs were like units of probability. Since 
assets are lotteries over possible amounts of 
francs, and francs are probability units, as- 
sets are like compound lotteries. If traders 
satisfy the reduction of compound lotteries 
axiom in expected utility theory, they should 
regard a gamble with an expected franc value 
of G as identical to a certain payment of G 
francs, so they should act as if they are risk 
neutral toward francs. If biases observed in 
earlier experiments were due to risk seeking, 
those biases should disappear in experi- 
ment 9r. 
A second control experiment (denoted 
10h) used a "high-stakes" dollar-per-franc 
conversion rate of $.005 rather than $.001. 
Subjects in this experiment made about $20 
per hour. Experiment 15xh used the same 
level of high stakes with experienced sub- 
jects. If apparent price biases are due to 
insufficient incentive to think carefully about 
probabilities, biases should be smaller in ex- 
periments 10h and 15xh. 
Figure 4 shows the mean prices from the 
risk-control experiment 9r (thick line) and 
the high-stakes experiment lOh (thin line).9 
Compared to prices from inexperienced sub- 
jects shown in Figure 2, prices in these ex- 
periments are extremely close to the Bayes- 
ian expected values, except in 1-red periods. 
Price regression results and allocations (in 
Tables 3 and 4) suggest the exact repre- 
sentativeness bias in 1-red periods is highly 
significant. Therefore, biases in 1-red periods 
8The value of the risk-seeking constant A was esti- 
mated in each experiment, assuming both constant ab- 
solute (CARS) and constant relative risk seeking 
(CRRS). The value of A was chosen to minimize the 
absolute deviations between observed price bias from 
Table 3 and the bias predicted by the Arrow-Pratt risk 
premium with parameter A, summed across the four 
possible samples. Weighting deviations by the number 
of trades in each sample minimized risk-adjusted biases 
better than not weighting them. The CARS and CRRS 
models fit almost identically. Using CARS, risk- 
adjusted biases in 1- and 2-red periods averaged 13.8 
and - 15.6 francs (experiments 1 to 8) and 4.5 and -6 
francs (experiments lix to 15xh). In experiments 9r 
and 10h risk adjustment actually increased 1-red biases 
to 55.5 and 56.4 francs. Furthermore, in experiment 9r, 
the estimated A was about equal in magnitude to A's in 
other experiments, though it should be zero in theory. 
'The lines end abruptly because each experiment has 
a different number of periods of each sample. There are 
five 0-red periods in 10h, for instance, and only three in 
9r. Also, the spike in the second I-red period of experi- 
ment 9r was a short burst of irrational buying at very 
high prices, which defies explanation. 
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in other experiments are probably not due to 
risk seeking or insuficient motivation. At the 
same time, the control experiments give evi- 
dence against the exact representativeness 
prediction in 2-red periods. 
D. Individual Juldgments and 
Market Prices 
The point of experiments like these is to 
compare behavior of individuals with behav- 
ior of markets in which individuals par- 
ticipate. So far there has been only an as- 
sumption individuals will err in using Bayes' 
rule but no direct comparison between indi- 
viduals and the market. However, we can 
make such a comparison because subjects 
did make individual probability judgments 
before trading began (except in experiments 
1 and 2). 
Judgments were rewarded with a quadratic 
scoring rule, with money incentives for accu- 
racy.10 The scoring rule is incentive compati- 
ble assuming risk neutrality (subjects should 
report their true subjective probabilities), but 
nonrisk neutrality will cause judgments to 
deviate from true beliefs. Subjects were given 
10 to 20 three-ball samples from the bingo 
cages, with instant feedback about whether 
X or Y occurred. After completing the scor- 
ing-rule exercise, subjects were informed that 
they would ranked according to their earn- 
ings from the scoring-rule exercise, from 1 to 
N. They were told to predict their rank, 
choosing exactly one number between 1 and 
N, and they were paid $5 if their rank was 
exactly correct. 
We can compare the average scoring-rule 
judgment with a probability estimate im- 
puted from the equilibrium price bias. For 
instance, in experiment 3 the estimated bias 
in 0-red periods was - 11.09 francs (see Ta- 
ble 3). Since type I traders were holding in 
these periods, and their payoffs range from 
200 (P(X) = 0) to 500 (P(X) =1), the prob- 
ability scale naturally corresponds to a 300- 
franc price scale from 200 to 500. A bias of 
- 11.09 francs implies a probability judg- 
ment of P( X/0-red) that is - 11.09/300, or 
-.037, different from the Bayesian posterior 
of .923. Probabilities were imputed from 
market prices for each sample and each ex- 
periment, using the estimated biases from 
Table 3. 
Average individual probabilities from the 
scoring rule and probabilities imputed from 
market prices, averaged across experiments, 
are shown in Table 5. Both kinds of prob- 
abilities are close to Bayesian in 0- and 3-red 
samples. In 1- and 2-red samples, the indi- 
viduals' probability estimates are closer to 
Bayesian than the market prices are,11 but 
the gap is smaller with experienced subjects. 
It seems that for exactly representative 
samples, markets are often more biased than 
"0Samples of three balls were drawn, exactly as in 
determining states, and subjects were asked to choose a 
two-digit "decision number" from 00 to 99. Define that 
number, divided by 100, as D. If event X occurred, 
subjects were paid 2D - D2 dollars. If event Y oc- 
curred, subjects were paid 1 - D2 dollars. Subjects were 
shown a table of the possible numerical payoffs. If a 
subject's true subjective probability of X occurring was 
S, and she choose D, her expected payoff was S(2 D - 
D 2 ) + (1-S)(1-D 2). This payoff has a maximum at 
D*= S, that is, subjects should truthfully choose their 
subjective probabilities as their decision numbers, ex- 
cept for risk aversion. If subjects are risk averse (risk 
seeking), their reported probabilities will be biased to- 
ward (away from) .5. 
"The differences between averaged scoring-rule 
judgments and probabilities implicit in market prices 
are highly significant by parametric t-tests, or by non- 
parametric matched-pairs or rank-sum tests, except in 
2-red periods with inexperienced subjects. 
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TABLE 5-AVERAGE PROBABILITY JUDGMENTS OF INDIVIDUALS AND PROBABILITIES 
IMPLICIT IN MARKET PRICES (EXPRESSED AS DEVIATIONS 
FROM THE BAYESIAN POSTERIOR P( X/SAMPLE)) 
Sample 0-Red 1-Red 2-Red 3-Red 
Direction of Deviation Predicted 
by Exact Representativeness: 0 + - 0 
Inexperienced Subjects (8 Experiments) 
Individual Mean -.009 -.030 -.031 -.022 
(Standard Deviation) (.044) (.087) (.033) (.076) 
Market Prices Mean -.008 +.141 -.100 -.035 
(Standard Deviation) (.062) (.081) (.193) (.073) 
Experienced Subjects (5 Experiments) 
Individual Mean +.037 -.026 -.043 -.084 
(Standard Deviation) (.022) (.052) (.061) (.069) 
Market Prices Mean +.007 +.059 -.081 -.016 
(Standard Deviation) (.092) (.049) (.044) (.117) 
individuals are. One explanation is that 
market prices are determined by one or two 
highly biased traders, but almost all traders 
were holding units at the biased prices. 
Another possibility is that the market mech- 
anism and the quadratic scoring rule simply 
elicit different probability judgments. 
One consolation is that the biases shrink 
with experience. A closer look at individual 
data may suggest why. For market prices to 
be less biased than individuals, traders who 
are less biased must exert more influence on 
the market price. There is no external market 
to evaluate whether traders are unbiased and 
allocate more trading capital to them. There- 
fore, to exert more influence the traders who 
are less biased must realize they are less 
biased, and trade more aggressively. 
Whether traders realize their relative abil- 
ity at probability judgment can be measured 
by whether their predicted ranks in the scor- 
ing-rule exercise are correlated with their 
actual ranks. The two sets of ranks were 
somewhat correlated-averaging .49 for in- 
experienced subjects and .30 for experienced 
subjects 2-so subjects do have some self-in- 
sight. However, predictions about relative 
ability are not highly correlated with the 
amount of arbitrage (defined as buying and 
selling in the same period). Those correla- 
tions averaged -.09 for inexperienced sub- 
jects, and .23 for experienced subjects. Fur- 
thermore, actual ranks and arbitrage were 
uncorrelated (.05 and -.12) with both inex- 
perienced and experienced subjects. It seems 
that aggressive trading, as measured by arbi- 
trage, is not something inexperienced sub- 
jects do only because they think they are 
better probability judges than others. 
III. Conclusion and Future Research 
In many experiments subjects do not fol- 
low the laws of probability, particularly 
Bayes' rule. However, subjects in these ex- 
periments are often unpaid and given little 
practice making judgments. In markets, 
traders often have incentives and experience, 
and people who are good at estimating prob- 
abilities can often exert more force on prices. 
Therefore, biases in individual judgments 
need not affect prices and allocations in 
markets. 
Whether biases affect market outcomes is 
tested in a series of simple experimental 
markets. In the markets, traders exchange 
units of an asset that pays a state-dependent 
dividend. A random device yields sample 
evidence about which state has occurred. 
Traders' demand for assets depends upon 
12 These are high correlations considering that the 
range of the predicted rank variable was restricted by 
subjects' optimism about their ranks. Sixty-two of 74 
inexperienced subjects (84 percent) thought they were in 
the top 50 percent in scoring-rule earnings, compared to 
23 of 40 experienced subjects (58 percent). Apparently 
optimism is nearly erased after one experiment. 
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their judgments about posterior state prob- 
ability. If the market functions as if traders 
are Bayesians, a certain pattern of prices and 
allocations is predicted to occur. But if 
traders overestimate P(state/sample), rela- 
tive to the Bayesian posterior, when the sam- 
ple exactly matches the contents of a bingo 
cage that represents the state, then different 
prices and allocations will occur. This com- 
peting theory is called "exact representative- 
ness." It is less useful than the Bayesian 
theory because it does not predict prices 
when samples do not exactly match states, 
but it does have some bite. Other non-Bayes- 
ian psychological theories can be defined 
too. 
In eight experiments with inexperienced 
subjects, prices tend toward the Bayesian 
predictions, but there is some evidence of 
exact representativeness bias in prices and 
allocations. However, the degree of bias is 
small, and it is even smaller in experiments 
with experienced subjects. All other non- 
Bayesian theories can be rejected.13 Further- 
more, the Bayesian theory predicts prices 
remarkably well when the exact repre- 
sentativeness theory does not apply. 
In most experiments, biases are statisti- 
cally significant for only one of the two 
samples (the 1-red sample) in which exact 
representativeness predicts bias. Indeed, if 
the reader values the only experiment with 
controls for risk seeking (9r), exact repre- 
sentativeness predicts no better than chance: 
it predicts the significant bias in the 1-red 
period correctly, but it predicts the wrong 
sign on the significant bias in the 2-red 
period. 
It is easy to imagine other market settings 
in which unbiased traders could correct 
market biases completely."4 Some of these 
settings are the subject of ongoing research. 
However, if one pretends to not know the 
results, it is easy to imagine that biases could 
have been entirely eliminated in these ex- 
periments, too. 
Whether the exact representativeness bi- 
ases in 1-red periods are significant depends 
upon your yardstick of significance. By one 
overworked yardstick, the statistical test of 
whether they could be due to chance, the 
biases in 1-red periods are highly significant. 
The possibility of excess profits is an im- 
portant yardstick in economics. There are 
apparently loss of profits to be earned from 
exploiting biased subjects, since they over- 
pay by roughly $.20 per trade (a few dollars 
per experiment) in 1-red periods of the 
high-stakes experiments 10h and 15xh. Ex- 
cess profits are a lot smaller, only about $.03 
per trade, in the other experiments. On the 
probability yardstick the biases are errors of 
about .10, which are large if your purpose is 
testing students' ability to make exact Bayes- 
ian calculations and small if your purpose is 
comparing these biases with errors found in 
other studies.'5 
Of course, if the stakes were large enough 
or (perhaps more importantly) traders had 
enough experience, the apparent biases might 
disappear entirely. Therefore, we should 
hesitate to generalize these results to the 
New York Stock Exchange (though some 
have tried'6), but the results may generalize 
to settings in which stakes are relatively small 
and agents have little experience in a re- 
peated situation. For instance, consumers 
might judge the quality of a new product by 
how much the product's packaging or adver- 
tising resembles that of well-known prod- 
ucts. Financial journalists sometimes argue a 
depression is ahead because a pattern of 
economic indicators resembles a pattern from 
13If subjects tended to ignore or underweight the 
unequal prior probabilities of the states, then 2-red 
biases would be larger than 1-red biases. Exactly the 
opposite is true. Notice also that overreaction predicts 
reasonably well in 1- and 2-red samples, when it over- 
laps with exact representativeness, but it predicts poorly 
in 0- and 3-red samples. 
14For instance, if biases caused prices to be lower 
than expected values, then unbiased traders would pay 
higher prices than biased traders, effectively setting the 
market price, so prices might appear unbiased. 
1 5For instance, in the well-known blue-green taxi 
problem (for example, Tversky and Kahneman, 1982b), 
the Bayesian posterior is around .4 but subjects often 
answer .80 because they ignore the low base rate of one 
type of taxi. 
16 Recall Arrow's (1982) suggestion cited above. 
Werner DeBondt and Richard Thaler (1985) also found 
empirical support for the representativeness prediction 
that investors do not expect regression in extreme earn- 
ings announcements. 
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before the Great Depression. (Whether such 
opinions affect market behavior is debatable.) 
The belief that the future is likely to be 
representative of the past could cause a 
failure to anticipate regression effects 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1982b): Forgetting 
about regression, consumers may avoid all 
Hyatt hotels or DC-1O's after an accident 
involving one of them; or studios might make 
movie sequels that are consistently unpro- 
fitable. The winner's curse in common-value 
auctions (see John Kagel and Dan Levin, 
1986) might be caused by a heuristiclike 
representativeness. These conjectures, wheth- 
er plausible or not, illustrate how repre- 
sentativeness bias akin to that observed in 
the experiments could affect economic out- 
comes in natural settings. 
There are several directions for future ex- 
periments. Institutional extensions of these 
markets, like short selling or a parallel market 
for information about probabilities, might 
eliminate biases entirely. Experiments in 
which other judgment biases could affect 
markets might be interesting too (for exam- 
ple, myself, George Loewenstein, and Martin 
Weber, 1987). A program of empirical work, 
including both experiments and extending 
experimental results to natural settings, could 
establish what kinds of irrationality seem to 
persist under the incentives and learning op- 
portunities present in natural markets. Such 
data might lead to economic theory that uses 
evidence of systematic irrationality to make 
better predictions. 
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